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INTERNATIONAL LAW 
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Gloria Chao** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
1.  Purpose 
As the programme guide indicates, the topic of our discussion is “The Rise of 
International Law in Canadian Constitutional Litigation.” Over the last decade, 
there have been tremendous developments in international law, including the 
proliferation of conventional law as well as the establishment of a number of 
international criminal and trade law fora. This growth has reverberated through 
domestic law as  
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in the past decade, a number of key constitutional law cases have applied prin-
ciples of international law; such cases have touched on a wide range of topics, 
including international trade obligations,1 war crimes or crimes against human-
ity,2 possibility of unilateral secession of a province,3 extradition leading to 
possible death penalty,4 and deportation of refugees to face possible torture.5 
                                                                                                                                                              
1
 National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324. 
2
 R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701. 
3
 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. 
4
 Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779; Ng, Re, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 
858; and United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283. 
5
 Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2002), 18 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1. 
24  Supreme Court Law Review (2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
The high profile nature of these cases has provoked much debate regarding 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation or application of international 
law. At the heart of the debate is the tension between the democratic principle 
underlying the internal legal order and the search for conformity or consistency 
with a developing and uncertain external legal order. Some feel the Court has 
given undue weight to principles of international law, others believe the Court 
should expand on and develop a more principled approach to its use of interna-
tional law in deciding domestic cases. The purpose of this discussion is to 
examine a few of the Court’s key decisions on the topic, highlighting the ten-
sion between the two approaches to using international law in constitutional 
law cases. 
2.  Purview 
As you may well appreciate, this topic is of boundless potential scope; there-
fore, we have taken the liberty of appending the subtitle “Fugue or Fusion? 
Recent Developments and Challenges in Internalizing International Law” to the 
title and limiting ourselves to looking primarily at decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Canada released in the last decade. 
Music enthusiasts may already be aware that the question in the subtitle re-
fers to two different styles of music from two different eras. “Fugue” is the 
term for the type of Baroque period music where one or two themes are re-
peated or imitated by successively entering and interweaving repetitive ele-
ments.6 “Fusion” is defined as a merging of diverse, distinct, or separate 
elements into a unified whole and is used in contemporary music to denote the 
                                                                                                                                                              
6
 “Fugue” is defined by Essentials of Music online (http://www.essentialsof 
music.com.) Date accessed: 20 March 2002) as follows: 
Polyphonic form popular in the Baroque era in which one or more themes are devel-
oped by imitative counterpoint. Example: Bach, Chromatic Fantasy and Fugue in D minor, 
Fugue  
A fugue is a complex composition in which the theme (called the subject) is developed 
by imitative counterpoint. In this example, the first imitation of the subject is heard over-
lapping the initial idea. 
The source Merriam-Webster Online (http://www.m-w.com/home.htm. Date of search: 20 March 
2002) defines “fugue” as follows: 
Etymology: probably from Italian fuga flight, fugue, from Latin, flight, from fugere  
Date: 1597  
1 a : a musical composition in which one or two themes are repeated or imitated by succes-
sively entering voices and contrapuntally developed in a continuous interweaving of 
the voice parts b: something that resembles a fugue especially in interweaving repeti-
tive elements  
2 : a disturbed state of consciousness in which the one affected seems to perform acts in 
full awareness but upon recovery cannot recollect the deeds  
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combination of different styles, most commonly, jazz and rock, to form a new 
style.7 A fugue is the metaphor for one approach to the internalization of inter-
national law principles: where international law is a separate order from the 
domestic legal order and must be formally incorporated in order to ensure an 
intersection or interweaving of the two orders of law. Fusion is the metaphor 
for another internalization approach: whereby international law informs and 
becomes an important part of the domestic legal order, especially in constitu-
tional law cases, in such a manner that although two legal orders are combined, 
the resulting decision merges elements of each order into a unified whole. 
This discussion examines some of the recent cases heard by the Court on the 
topic and attempts to identify which of the two metaphors best describes the 
current approach taken by the Court in the internalization of international law. 
It is divided into the following parts. 
Part I sets out the definition and sources of international law and the uncer-
tainties associated with those sources of law. 
Part II examines the application of international law to the Canadian legal 
order. This is the main part of our discussion and is divided into two parts. 
First, we inquire into the difficulties of internalizing principles and rules of 
international law into the domestic legal order, highlighting the increased com-
plexities of doing so in the constitutional law context. Secondly, we discuss the 
rise of international law in Canadian constitutional litigation, paying particular 
attention to four recent cases decided by the Court: the Finta, Baker,8 Burns 
and Suresh cases and noting the various approaches to the use of international 
law by the Court. 
And finally, Part III makes a few suggestions that, hopefully, might assist the 
constitutional litigator in setting out the relevance of any international law 
arguments raised before the Court. The thesis underlying this discussion is that 
awareness of the pitfalls and misconceptions of the use of international law in 
                                                                                                                                                              
7
 “Fusion” is defined by Essentials of Music online (http://www.essentialsof 
music.com. Date accessed: 20 March 2002) as follows:  
Style that combines jazz improvisation with amplified instruments of rock. 
 The source Merriam-Webster Online (http://www.m-w.com/home.htm. Date of search: 20 
March 2002) defines “fusion” as follows: 
Etymology: Latin fusion-, fusio, from fundere  
Date: 1555  
1 : the act or process of liquefying or rendering plastic by heat  
2 : a union by or as if by melting: as a : a merging of diverse, distinct, or separate ele-
ments into a unified whole b : a political partnership : COALITION c : popular music 
combining different styles (as jazz and rock)  
3 : the union of atomic nuclei to form heavier nuclei resulting in the release of enormous 
quantities of energy when certain light elements unite  
8
 Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. 
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constitutional litigation may assist the litigator in attaining a better understand-
ing of its relationship with internal Canadian law. Before we move on to the 
discussion, a word of caution appears necessary: these comments do not repre-
sent the position of the Supreme Court of Canada, but reflect only our own 
views and concerns. 
II. DEFINITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1.  Historical and Modern Definitions 
It is almost trite to say so, but a good part of the debate associated with the 
Court’s use of international law in constitutional cases lies in the difficulty of 
defining public international law. The notion of public international law has 
developed and evolved over a number of centuries. 
From the time of the Middle Ages,9 a state-based system of rules formed the 
key component of international law.10 The term began to expand at the end of 
the Middle Ages, whereby international organizations, and even individuals 
may be subjects of rights conferred and obligations imposed by international 
law.11 However, the essence of the state-based definition was still found in the 
1625 seminal work of Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Libri 
iii.12 Considered the father of international law, Grotius presented his general 
conception of international law, explaining how the sovereign power could only 
be limited by natural law and/or agreements between sovereign states.13 Given 
the importance of Grotius’ work, it is not surprising that modern standard defi-
nitions tend to focus on the relations of nations with each other,14 placing less 
emphasis on the rights of individuals under international law. 
                                                                                                                                                              
9
 Although the Chinese, Indian, Greek, and Roman cultures evidenced some notions of in-
ternational relations and rules prior to the Middle Ages, these were applied primarily on a regional 
basis and pre-dated the existence of the modern state. See Emanuelli, Droit international public 
(1998), at 16-17; Dinh, Droit international public (6e éd., 1999), at 42-46; and Carreau, Droit 
international (7e éd., 2001), at 9-14. 
10
 Dinh, id., at 42-49. 
11
 Jennings & Watts, eds., Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed., 1992), vol. I, at 4. 
12
 Grotius, The rights of war and peace: in three books wherein are explained the law of na-
ture and nations and the principal points relating to government, trans. J. Barbeyac (1738). See 
also Emanuelli, supra, note 9, at 19-20; Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations 
(1950); and Hamilton, Hugo Grotius: the father of the modern science of international law (1986, 
c. 1917). 
13
 Dinh, supra, note 9, at 55-56. 
14
 See Emanuelli, supra, note 9, who writes at 1, para. 1: 
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Common to both historical and modern definitions is the sharp distinction 
between domestic and international law: the latter lacks the constitutional 
mechanism to concretize the law. As Ian Brownlie observes: 
In the context of international relations the use of the term “formal source” is awk-
ward and misleading since the reader is put in mind of the constitutional machinery 
of law-making which exists within states. No such machinery exists for the creation 
of rules of international law. Decisions of the International Court, unanimously 
supported resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations concerning 
matters of law, and important multilateral treaties concerned to codify or develop 
rules of international law, are all lacking the quality to bind states generally in the 
same way that Acts of Parliament bind the people...15 [Emphasis added.] 
Instead, the primary basis of international law is that the “general consent of 
states creates rules of general application. The definition of custom in interna-
tional law is essentially a statement of this principle...”16 
2.  Key Sources 
The key sources of international law that are indicia of such general consent 
are found in a number of materials. Paragraph 1 of Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice,17 which sets out the functions of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, is generally regarded as a complete statement of the 
sources of international law:18 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
                                                                                                                                                              
Le droit international public peut se définir comme l’ensemble des normes juridiques 
qui régissent les rapports entre les membres (États, organisations intergouvernementales) de 
la communauté internationale. 
 See also Brun & Tremblay, Droit constitutionnel (3e éd., 1997), at 3; Combacau Sur, 
Droit international public (5e éd., 2001), at 2, where they write:  
S. 1 Les relations interétatiques et leur droit - Le premier type de relations 
internationales est celui qui soulève le moins de difficultés quant à son identification et à 
celle du droit qui lui est applicable.  
See further Carreau, supra, note 9, at 19-20, where the author describes the structure of the classical 
international society; and Dukelow & Nuse, The Dictionary of Canadian Law (2nd ed., 1995) at 
625, who define public international law as follows: 
a code of rules which controls the conduct of independent nations in their relations 
with one another. 
15
 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th ed., 1998), at 1-2. 
16
 Brownlie, id., at 2. 
17
 As found in the Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7. 
18
 See Emanuelli, supra, note 9, at 39; Brownlie, supra, note 15, at 3; and Jennings & Watts, 
supra, note 11, at 24.  
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a)  international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law. 
... 
Generally, the principal sources of international law are the first three on the 
list: international conventions, customary law, and general principles of law; 
however, even these three sources entail some uncertainty as to their applica-
tion. 
International conventions are bilateral or multilateral instruments signed with 
obligations and benefits for states or individuals. They generally include, inter 
alia treaties, agreements, and covenants, and lend themselves to relatively 
straightforward incorporation into domestic law. It is, however, noted that 
many of these documents include aspirational declarations, programmes of 
action, guidelines, and protocols, also known as “soft law”.19 Although such 
general statements or declarations are useful as they allow obligations to be 
formed “in a precise and restrictive form that would not be acceptable in a 
binding treaty,”20 by its very nature, “soft law” does not set out how these 
principles may be applied in domestic legal orders.21 Rather, since state sover-
eignty is one of the basic tenets of international public law,22 there is generally 
                                                                                                                                                              
19
 In “New Ways to Make International Environmental Law” (1992) 86 A.J.I.L. 259, at 269, 
Palmer remarks that “soft law” leaves large amounts of discretion to the states: “Frequently, what is 
expressed is a series of political statements or values.”  
20
 Birnie & Boyle, International Law and the Environment (1992), at 27. See also 
VanderZwaag’s comments on the utility of “soft law” in VanderZwaag, Canada and Marine 
Environmental Protection Charting a Legal Course Towards Sustainable Development (1995), at 
41: 
Nevertheless, the creative force of “soft law” principles should not be underestimated... this 
twilight realm of international law, “soft law”, has the potential to enlighten and guide law re-
forms at the international, regional and national levels. As crucibles for further social, eco-
nomic, political, technological, cultural and scientific thinking, the principles shed light on the 
major “spark points” for energizing further legal development. [Emphasis added.] 
21
 Birnie & Boye, id., at 123, observe that: “What is lacking, however, is any comparable 
consensus on the meaning of sustainable development, or how to give it concrete effect in individu-
al cases.” 
22
 A basic norm of customary international environmental law is that states have the sover-
eign right to exploit their own resources so long as no damage is caused to other states. See Trail 
Smelter (U.S. v. Canada) (1941), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905. This norm has been reproduced in “soft law” 
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no legal impetus for states to implement “soft law” declarations even if they are 
a party or signatory to them. Therefore, while these principles are laudable, it is 
important to note that they have been criticized for being rather vague,23 failing 
to set out how states may implement them in domestic legal systems. 
The second source, customary law, is also difficult to implement in the do-
mestic legal order. A party relying on customary law must meet the two criteria 
of consistent international practice and opinio juris24 and must prove that this 
custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other 
party.25 These criteria require that the party provide wide-sweeping objective 
and subjective evidence of the establishment of a custom; this distinction is 
problematic as it is often difficult to determine what states believe as opposed 
to what they say.26 Contrary state practice can be regarded as either a breach of 
an old custom or the seed of a new one.27 Therefore, unless the impugned cus-
tom is formally ratified and adopted into national legislation, it could be diffi-
cult to situate the custom in the domestic legal order. 
The third key source of international law are the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations. This is yet another category whose application 
becomes problematic at times. First, it is difficult to define exactly what general 
principles of law are, and second, there is no way of identifying who makes up 
the group of “civilized nations”,28 now commonly referred to as a community 
                                                                                                                                                              
documents such as the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, 16 June 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14/Rev.1, reprinted at (1972) 11 I.L.M. 1416, 
Principle 21, and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 13 June 1992, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1, reprinted in (1992) 31 I.L.M. 874, Principle 2.  
23
 See Panjabi, “From Stockholm to Rio: A Comparison of the Declaratory Principles of In-
ternational Environmental Law” (1993) 21 Den. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y. 215, at 272; and VanderZwaag, 
Canada and Marine, supra, note 20, at 38-39. 
24
 Kindred, Castel, Fleming, Graham, de Mestral, Reif, Vlasic & Williams, International 
Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada (5th ed., 1993), at 174. 
25
 See Asylum (Colombia/Peru) case, (1950) I.C.J. Rep. 4 (266), at 14-15 (276-7); and Nica-
ragua v. United States (Merits) (1986) I.C.J. Rep. 4 (14), at 88 (98), para. 186. 
26
 Roberts, “Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Recon-
ciliation” (2001) 95 A.J.I.L. 757, at 757. 
27
 Roberts, id., at 790. 
28
 See the dissenting opinion of La Forest J. in R. v. Finta, supra, note 2, at 773, where he 
quotes Green, “Canadian Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity” (1988), 59 Brit. Y.B. 
Int’l L. 217, at 226:  
… a major problem would arise in seeking to ascertain just what is meant by the ‘general 
principles of law recognized by the community of nations’. . . . The difficulty lies in deter-
mining what are ‘general principles of law’ and what percentage of the world’s States con-
stitutes a sufficient proportion to be considered ‘the community of nations’. Does this 
collection have to include every major power or be representative of all the leading legal 
systems of the world? 
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of nations.29 Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts describe this source of 
international law as follows: 
The legal principles which find a place in all or most of the various national sys-
tems of law naturally commend themselves to states for application in the interna-
tional legal system, as being almost necessarily inherent in any legal system within 
the experience of states... The intention is to authorise the Court to apply the gen-
eral principles of municipal jurisprudence, insofar as they are applicable to relations 
of states.30 
One subset of this source of law is domestic law, necessitating a comparison 
between the different national judicial systems.31 The use of general domestic 
principles as principles of international law is not automatic; domestic princi-
ples must be “transportable” into international law.32 These principles are 
adapted for use into international law over time, as Brownlie explains: 
It would be incorrect to assume that tribunals have in practice adopted a mechanical 
system of borrowing from domestic law after a census of domestic systems. What 
has happened is that international tribunals have employed elements of legal rea-
soning and private law analogies in order to make the law of nations a viable sys-
tem for application in a judicial process. Thus, it is impossible, or at least difficult, 
for state practice to evolve the rules of procedure and evidence which a court must 
employ. An international tribunal chooses, edits, and adapts elements from better 
developed systems: the result is a new element of international law the content of 
which is influenced historically and logically by domestic law.33 [Emphasis added.] 
Although certain domestic general principles occupy an important position 
in international law, such as the principle of good faith, equity, estoppel, abuse 
                                                                                                                                                              
29
 See Dinh, supra, note 9, at 347, who writes that: 
... étant entendu qu’il ne faut pas s’arrêter à la lettre de la formule désuète: «nations 
civilisées» - à tort ou à raison, tous les États sont considérés aujourd’hui comme répondant 
à cette appellation. 
 See also Emanuelli, supra, note 9, who writes at 101: 
L’expression «principes généraux de droit reconnus par les nations civilisées» est 
héritée d’une époque où les penseurs occidentaux, encouragés par les progrès de la science 
et la montée des idées libérales, considéraient certaines nations comme des modèles de civi-
lisation. Elle paraît aujourd’hui dépassée, car elle implique que d’autres nations ne sont pas 
civilisées, ce qui, dans le contexte des Nations Unies, est difficilement acceptable. Il 
conviendrait plutôt de parler de principes généraux reconnus par l’ensemble des nations. 
30
 Jennings & Watts, supra, note 11, at 36-37 [footnotes omitted].  
31
 Emanuelli, supra, note 9, at 101. 
32
 Dinh, supra, note 9, at 348. 
33
 See Emanuelli, supra, note 9, at 102; and Brownlie, supra, note 15, at 16. 
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of law, unjust enrichment, clean hands doctrine and issue estoppel,34 Jennings 
and Watts admit that these principles generally have a limited application: 
In thus opening the way for the operation as international law of general principles 
of municipal jurisprudence, it must be noted that such principles are in the munici-
pal sphere applied against a background of national laws and procedures. Unless 
there is some sufficient counterpart to them in the international sphere, or sufficient 
allowance is made for them in abstracting the principles from the various municipal 
rules, the operation of the principles as a source of particular rules of international 
law will be distorted.35 [Emphasis added.] 
Another subset of this source of general principles of international law is 
found in the international legal order itself. These principles include: reciprocal 
respect of sovereignty, the principle of the continuity of the state, and the prin-
ciple of the need to exhaust internal mechanisms before resorting to interna-
tional law.36 
Given the uncertainties surrounding the identification and use of these gen-
eral principles of international law, it is therefore not surprising that the Interna-
tional Court of Justice has “shown considerable discretion in the matter”37 and 
has seldom found occasion to prefer the application of “general principles of 
law” over that of conventional or customary international law.38 
Paragraph 1 of Article 38 is not meant to create a hierarchy of sources,39 
however, there are a number of rules governing interpretation of these sources. 
As Brownlie notes: 
Source (a) relates to obligations in any case; and presumably a treaty contrary to a 
custom or to a general principle part of the jus cogens would be void or voidable. 
Again, the interpretation of a treaty may involve resort to general principles of law 
or of international law. A treaty may be displaced or amended by a subsequent cus-
tom, where such effects are recognized by the subsequent conduct of the parties.40 
This concept of jus cogens being a peremptory norm is a comparatively re-
cent development in international law. Therefore, there is no general agreement 
                                                                                                                                                              
34
 Jennings & Watts, supra, note 11, at 38.  
35
 Jennings & Watts, supra, note 11, at 37 [footnotes omitted].  
36
 Emanuelli, supra, note 9, at 102. 
37
 Brownlie, supra, note 15, at 16. 
38
 Jennings & Watts, supra, note 11, at 37-38 [footnotes omitted].  
39
 See Emanuelli, supra, note 9, at 119-120; Brownlie, supra, note 15, at 3; and also Jen-
nings & Watts, supra, note 11, who note at 25 that: 
Furthermore, the sources of international law are not self-contained but interrelated, and each 
source gives rise to rules which have to be understood against the background of rules deriv-
ing from other sources, so that any non-consensual element in one source of law may indirect-
ly affect the rules deriving from other sources. 
40
 Brownlie, supra, note 15, at 4 [footnotes not included]. 
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on which rules are of a jus cogens character.41 Jus cogens is described by 
Brownlie as follows: 
Jurists have from time to time attempted to classify rules, or rights and duties, on 
the international plane by use of terms like ‘fundamental’ or, in respect to rights, 
‘inalienable’ or ‘inherent’. Such classifications have not had much success, but 
have intermittently affected the interpretation of treaties by tribunals. In the recent 
past some eminent opinions have supported the view that certain overriding princi-
ples of international law exist, forming a body of jus cogens. 
The major distinguishing feature of such rules is their relative indelibility. They are 
rules of customary law which cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence but only 
by the formation of a subsequent customary rule of contrary effect.42 
Jurists have noted that the least controversial examples of the class are the 
prohibition of the use of force, the law of genocide, the principle of racial non-
discrimination, crimes against humanity, and the rules prohibiting trade in 
slaves and piracy.43 These examples were confirmed by the International Court 
of Justice in the case, Barcelona Traction (Second Phase),44 where the majority 
judgment of the ICJ noted that these were not simply obligations of a state 
arising vis-à-vis another state, but rather, obligations “towards the international 
community as a whole”. 
Articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,45 pro-
vide that existing or new peremptory norms prevail over treaties. Article 53 
defines a peremptory norm as: 
a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified 
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. 
As the authors Emanuelli and Charles de Visscher point out, the difficulty in 
deciding whether a norm is to be considered jus cogens rests in the fact that the 
                                                                                                                                                              
41
 Jennings & Watts, supra, note 11, at 7. 
42
 Brownlie, supra, note 15, at 514-15 [footnotes not included]. 
43
 See Arbour, Droit international public (3e éd., 1997) at 35; Brownlie, supra, note 15, at 
515; and Jennings & Watts, supra, note 11, at 8. 
44
 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain) (Second Phase), (1970) 
I.C.J. Rep. 3, at 33, para. 33, where the majority of the ICJ noted that obligations towards the 
international community as a whole are those which “...all states can be held to have a legal interest 
in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.” Paragraph 34 set out a similar list of examples 
as that found in the text and noted that such obligations can derive from, inter alia, principles, rules, 
the body of international law, and international instruments of universal or quasi-universal charac-
ter. 
45
 Can. T.S. 1980 No. 37, signed 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980 (acceded 
to by Canada on 14 October 1970). 
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Vienna Convention does not provide criteria for its definition.46 As the estab-
lishment of the norms of jus cogens is uncertain, de Visscher aptly concludes 
that the proponent of a rule of jus cogens will have a considerable burden of 
proof.47 
Another uncertainty surrounding the operation of a rule of jus cogens is with 
respect to the relationship among the various rules of jus cogens. In particular, 
what is the legitimacy of an act done in reliance of one rule of jus cogens but 
resulting in a violation of another such rule?48 
III. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  
IN THE DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDER 
1.  Internalization of International Law 
(a) General Uncertainties Surrounding Reception 
As mentioned above, the three key sources of international law are interna-
tional conventions, customs and general principles of law. It has been noted 
that Canada’s system of receiving international law into the domestic legal 
order is neither monist nor dualist; it is a hybrid of the two, demanding the 
implementation of conventional international law but allowing for the incorpo-
ration of customary international law.49 As straightforward as this assertion may 
appear, it is not without its uncertainties. 
First, it is generally agreed that international conventional law does not have 
a formal place in the domestic legal order unless it is ratified by the executive 
and implemented by the legislature.50 Historically, this two-step process is 
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explained by the English parliamentary tradition whereby the sovereign who 
negotiates and signs the treaty cannot usurp Parliament’s law-making power.51 
Despite this seemingly straight forward reception process, a number of ques-
tions arise. First, how does the Court interpret a convention if the implementing 
statute only includes parts of the convention? Also, can the Court give any 
weight to a convention that has been ratified by the executive but not yet or 
incompletely implemented by legislation? Henri Brun and Guy Tremblay re-
mark that though an international convention must generally be incorporated by 
legislation, nothing prevents judges from inspiring themselves of the conven-
tion in the development of the common law.52 However, as noted by David 
Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt and Michael Taggart, judicial reliance on a conven-
tion that is halfway internalized by the domestic legal system may raise serious 
concerns about whether or not it accords with democratic principles and the 
fundamental structure of the state: 
Courts throughout the common law world have, for some time, given effect to in-
ternational legal obligations (especially human rights norms) by way of administra-
tive law doctrines and techniques. When the source of the international obligations 
constraining executive discretion is a convention ratified by the executive, but not 
incorporated by parliament into legislation, traditional alarm bells ring. Such 
“backdoor” incorporation seems to amount to executive usurpation of the legisla-
ture’s monopoly of law-making authority, or to judicial usurpation of the same, or 
to a combination of both.53 
Secondly, although customary international law may not require formal im-
plementation, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly when a practice or a belief may 
be relied upon as a custom. The simple existence of an alleged custom in inter-
national law may not be enough for it to be internalized into the domestic legal 
order. As Brun and Tremblay remark, a prohibitive custom that is universally 
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recognized is akin to a rule of common law in the internal legal order; however, 
a permissive custom will necessitate legislative incorporation in order to be 
admitted into the domestic legal order.54 In general, not all customary law 
principles appear to be automatically admitted into domestic law and a number 
of outstanding questions remain, including: Which customs prevail in cases of 
conflict? Also, which customs become jus cogens? If one incorporates evolving 
or developing customs or “soft law” into domestic law, does that not subvert 
what has been defined as one of the basic principles of Canadian constitutional 
law — the democratic principle? 
Thirdly, the incorporation of general principles of law into the domestic legal 
order presents its own set of difficulties. As noted above, general principles of 
law consist of both international law as well as domestic law from other na-
tions. Although general principles of international law may be incorporated into 
domestic law, it is more difficult to conceive of how the domestic general legal 
principles of other nations are “incorporated” into the Canadian legal order. 
Instead, a more appropriate conception of these general principles of law is to 
view them as comparative legal sources. The problems we encounter when 
using such principles as guidelines include the difficulty in knowing which 
countries present appropriate comparisons and the uncertainty of knowing 
exactly how many countries are needed to form a meaningful comparison. 
These difficulties of comparative law analyses are discussed further below. 
In practical terms, it seems that there is no easy or automatic way of internal-
izing international law into the domestic legal order.55 It may be possible to 
characterize the reception of international conventions as the interweaving of 
two legal orders in a fugue-like fashion and the reception of customary and 
general principles of law as more of a fusion of the two orders. However, given 
the uncertainties surrounding the internalization of international law, we have 
seen that there are numerous exceptions to these general observations. Indeed, 
the legitimacy of international law as a source of law in the domestic legal 
order will always be scrutinized and called into question. 
Therefore, while generally agreeing with the opinions of the authors cited 
above, we emphasize that the reception of international law into the Canadian 
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legal system must in itself form part of the argument advanced by counsel. In 
other words, if parties wish to rely on a certain principle of international law as 
a binding obligation, they should endeavour to establish how that principle 
became binding and how it applies to their case. This is all the more necessary 
when combining two shifting orders of law together: international and constitu-
tional law. 
(b) Difficulties of Combining Two Shifting Orders of Law 
International law and constitutional law are each politically complex and so-
cially dynamic areas of law in their own right. In using international law to 
circumscribe and decide cases in domestic constitutional law, there is an inevi-
table collision between these two forces. In particular, the principal difficulties 
in combining these two shifting orders of law include: the limited nature of 
constitutional issues, potential conflicts between presumptions of constitutional 
law and those of international law, and the broad scope of international law and 
the unwritten principles of the Constitution.56 These problems need to be con-
sidered by the constitutional litigator when pleading international law principles 
before the Court. 
(i) Scope of Constitutional Issues 
First, the constitutional litigator must be aware of the potential conflict be-
tween the limited nature of constitutional issues and the oftentimes general and 
abstract nature of international law. In the case, Moysa v. Alberta (Labour 
Relations Board),57 Sopinka J. remarked that: 
If the facts of the case do not require that constitutional questions be answered, the 
Court will ordinarily not do so. This policy of the Court not to deal with abstract 
questions is of particular importance in constitutional matters. See Borowski v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, at pp. 363-65. 
... To address the questions would require that this Court make pronouncements 
well beyond the issues presented in the actual appeal. The adjudication of the actual 
dispute does not require the resolution of the abstract questions of law raised in the 
constitutional questions. [Emphasis added.] 
In the case, Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General),58 Sopinka J., again writ-
ing for the Court, made the following remarks on mootness: 
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The doctrine of mootness is an aspect of a general policy or practice that a court 
may decline to decide a case which raises merely a hypothetical or abstract ques-
tion. The general principle applies when the decision of the court will not have the 
effect of resolving some controversy which affects or may affect the rights of the 
parties. If the decision of the court will have no practical effect on such rights, the 
court will decline to decide the case. This essential ingredient must be present not 
only when the action or proceeding is commenced but at the time when the court is 
called upon to reach a decision. Accordingly if, subsequent to the initiation of the 
action or proceeding, events occur which affect the relationship of the parties so 
that no present live controversy exists which affects the rights of the parties, the 
case is said to be moot. The general policy or practice is enforced in moot cases 
unless the court exercises its discretion to depart from its policy or practice.... 
In other words, the Court limits the scope of its review to the issues at bar 
and does not venture into moot questions to satisfy its own or other academic 
curiosity. It is true that one may find it difficult to trace a dominant theme or 
theory on international law developed in the case law. However, this is not 
surprising. Questions of constitutional law affecting international law are 
brought before the Court on a fortuitous basis. Therefore, the Court’s pro-
nouncements on these narrow questions are limited to the evidence brought 
before the Court. The Court is obliged to respond to each question as it relates 
to the particular case and cannot expound on a treatise of law. International law 
has traditionally developed in a global manner and is not neatly absorbed by a 
domestic court of law charged with answering a narrow question put before it. 
(ii) Potential Conflicts between Statutory Interpretation Presumptions 
Constitutional law entails many complex statutory interpretation rules. The 
legal presumption of validity is characterized by Mr. Justice Barry Strayer of 
the Federal Court, Trial Division (now of the Federal Court of Appeal) as fol-
lows: 
It has long been said by the courts that they will presume an impugned law to be 
valid where there is an ambiguity in its scope that would otherwise allow the law to 
be characterized either as valid or invalid depending on the meaning ascribed to it. 
The presumption is said to apply to lead the court to conclude both that the enacting 
legislature intended to stay within its assigned powers and to stay within its as-
signed geographical territory, unless a contrary interpretation is inevitable. [Em-
phasis added.]59 
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Also, generally, a legislative provision is to be construed so as to permit it to 
serve a useful purpose. As Pierre-André Côté observes: 
A corollary of the rule of effectivity favours the interpretation that best promotes 
the validity of the enactment, over one that invalidates it.60 
There is a possibility that this constitutional law presumption may conflict 
with another presumption: implementing legislation is meant to comply with 
and give effect to the obligations set out under an international instrument.61 
This presumption is rebuttable, though and in the case of a conflict between the 
intended meaning of the legislation and the underlying international conven-
tion, the legislation prevails.62 
These conflicts of presumption seem inevitable when combining two areas 
of law which are as dynamic as constitutional and international law.63 
(iii) Broad Principles of International Law and Underlying  
Constitutional Principles 
The broad nature of international law and the uncertain nature of the under-
lying principles of constitutional law can both add to the complex interplay 
between international and constitutional law. 
With respect to international law, the Court has had to consider whether it is 
at times so broad as to be unconstitutionally vague. In the Finta case, writing 
for the majority, Cory J. stated that although it may be argued that international 
law is so broad that it is uncertain and therefore, unconstitutionally vague, there 
are indicia in international law that indicate the certainty or stability of certain 
international legal principles: 
In my view, the fact that the entire body of international law is not codified and that 
reference must be made to opinions of experts and legal writing in interpreting it 
does not in itself make the legislation vague or uncertain. This material is often 
helpful in determining the proper interpretations to be given to a statute. Further, 
the fact that there may be differences of opinion among international law experts 
does not necessarily make the legislation vague. It is ultimately for the court to de-
termine the interpretation that is to be given to a statute...64 
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Cory J. relied on principles established in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney 
General),65 where it was recognized at page 983 that: 
Absolute precision in the law exists rarely, if at all. The question is whether the leg-
islature has provided an intelligible standard according to which the judiciary must 
do its work. The task of interpreting how that standard applies in particular in-
stances might always be characterized as having a discretionary element, because 
the standard can never specify all the instances in which it applies. 
In his minority opinion, La Forest J. wrote, confirming this approach: 
To the extent that arguments of vagueness apply to the jurisdiction section... I con-
sider this to be based first of all on a limited view of the nature and content of in-
ternational law. As Williams and de Mestral, supra, at p. 12, note, even though 
there is no comprehensive codification, international law can nevertheless be de-
termined. Given our common law tradition, we should be used to finding the law in 
a number of disparate sources... 66 
La Forest J. relied on the standard for unconstitutional vagueness set out by 
the Court in R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society;67 and U.N.A. v. Alberta 
(Attorney General),68 and found that the argumentation of international law 
based on “the contents of the customary, conventional and comparative sources 
provide enough specificity to meet these standards for vagueness.”69 
Also, in the Suresh case, the Court considered whether the terms “danger to 
the security of Canada” and “terrorism” were unconstitutionally vague. Ac-
knowledging the difficulty of defining value-based international terms, the 
Court wrote: 
We also accept that the determination of what constitutes a “danger to the security 
of Canada” is highly fact-based and political in a general sense. All this suggests a 
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broad and flexible approach to national security and, as discussed above, a deferen-
tial standard of judicial review...70 [Emphasis added.] 
With respect to terrorism, the Court relied on definitions found in recently 
negotiated international instruments on the subject and held that “[w]e are not 
persuaded, however, that the term ‘terrorism’ is so unsettled that it cannot set 
the proper boundaries of legal adjudication.”71 
The interpretation of underlying constitutional principles also presents uncer-
tainties. In Reference re Secession of Quebec,72 the Court held that the animat-
ing principles underlying the written document must be subject to a “profound 
investigation”73 in order to understand the full meaning and purpose of the 
Constitution. These principles include: federalism, democracy, constitutional-
ism, the rule of law,74 and respect for minorities. As was the case with interna-
tional legal principles, it appears that the interpretation of underlying 
constitutional principles raises the same fugue or fusion question. Indeed, the 
Court has set out these two possible approaches in the Secession Reference. 
The fugue possibility is found at paragraph 52, where the Court acknowl-
edges that these underlying principles may inspire the interpretation of the 
Constitution: 
The principles assist in the interpretation of the text and the delineation of spheres 
of jurisdiction, the scope of rights and obligations, and the role of our political in-
stitutions. Equally important, observance of and respect for these principles is es-
sential to the ongoing process of constitutional development and evolution of our 
Constitution as a “living tree”, to invoke the famous description in Edwards v. At-
torney-General for Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.), at p. 136. As this Court indi-
cated in New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of 
Assembly), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319, Canadians have long recognized the existence and 
importance of unwritten constitutional principles in our system of government. 
[Emphasis added.] 
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The fusion possibility is also implicitly included as a possible interpretation 
approach. In certain circumstances, underlying principles of constitutional law 
can create new obligations as described at paragraph 54: 
Underlying constitutional principles may in certain circumstances give rise to sub-
stantive legal obligations (have “full legal force”, as we described it in the Patria-
tion Reference, supra, at p. 845), which constitute substantive limitations upon 
government action. These principles may give rise to very abstract and general ob-
ligations, or they may be more specific and precise in nature. The principles are not 
merely descriptive, but are also invested with a powerful normative force, and are 
binding upon both courts and governments... 
Although the Secession Reference does not make explicit reference to a 
combining of the underlying constitutional principles with other notions of the 
domestic legal order in creating new obligations, we cannot imagine circum-
stances where these underlying principles could create new obligations of a 
“powerful normative force” in isolation from other principles of domestic law. 
As with the various sources of international law, some general interpretation 
rules govern the underlying principles and the principles explicitly set out in the 
Constitution. At paragraph 53, the Court noted that it had cautioned in Refer-
ence re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward 
Island,75 that the recognition of these underlying principles could not be taken 
as an invitation to dispense with the written text of the Constitution: 
...On the contrary, we confirmed that there are compelling reasons to insist upon 
the primacy of our written constitution. A written constitution promotes legal cer-
tainty and predictability, and it provides a foundation and a touchstone for the exer-
cise of constitutional judicial review. However, we also observed in the Provincial 
Judges Reference that the effect of the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 was 
to incorporate certain constitutional principles by reference, a point made earlier in 
Fraser v. Public Service Staff Relations Board, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455, at pp. 462-63. 
In the Provincial Judges Reference, at para. 104, we determined that the preamble 
“invites the courts to turn those principles into the premises of a constitutional ar-
gument that culminates in the filling of gaps in the express terms of the constitu-
tional text”. [Emphasis added.] 
Although grounded in constitutional law,76 these underlying principles of the 
Constitution are not easy to apply in a concrete manner.77 The difficulty is seen 
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in the recent case of Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice v. 
New Brunswick.78 Akin to this difficulty is the challenge of applying broad 
notions of international customary or “soft law”. It is not without struggle that 
the Court attempts to apply these underlying constitutional and international 
law notions in domestic cases, mindful of potential charges that its application 
could be seen as being political, unprincipled or undemocratic. 
2. Rising Use of International Law in Canadian  
Constitutional Litigation 
(a)  Historical Uses of International Law in Canadian Constitutional Cases 
The Supreme Court of Canada has a long history of pronouncing on how in-
ternational law can be used in the determination of constitutional law cases. For 
example, as early as 1936, the Court examined the need for treaty obligations to 
be transformed into domestic law in conformity with the division of legislative 
powers79 and in 1943 the Court considered whether or not it could apply cus-
tomary international law directly without a formal transformation into domestic 
law.80 
With the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982, the number of cases mak-
ing use of international public law instruments increased dramatically. Writing 
on this development in the jurisprudence of the Court, Mr. Justice Gérard La 
Forest reported that, between 1984-1996, the Court made use of key interna-
tional human rights instruments in fifty cases in interpreting the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.81 Since then, that number has doubled.82 La 
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Forest J. thus explained the necessity of taking into account the applicable 
international law in Charter cases: 
The protection of human rights is not a uniquely Canadian concept and just as the 
drafters of the Charter drew on the experience and successes of the international 
human rights movement, so too would it be necessary for the Canadian courts to 
look abroad.83 
The authors, Maxwell Cohen, Q.C. and Ann Bayefsky observe that: 
The very fact...that the “supreme law of Canada” represented by the Charter, is in-
dissoluably linked by language and ideology to important international instruments 
and principles to which Canada subscribes, assures the inevitability of some resort 
to these “external” international legal documents and ideas in order to be certain 
that on appropriate occasions the “proper” meaning is given to that Charter.84 
Soon after the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Court examined 
the scope of application of international law in the Canadian legal order in a 
number of key cases. In the case, Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicles 
Act (British Columbia),85 Lamer J. (as he then was) expressly recognized that 
international law and opinion is of use to the courts in elucidating the scope of 
fundamental justice: 
[Principles of fundamental justice] represent principles which have been recognized 
by the common law, the international conventions and by the very fact of en-
trenchment in the Charter, as essential elements of a system for the administration 
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of justice which is founded upon the belief in the dignity and worth of the human 
person and the rule of law. [Emphasis added.]86 
Also, in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson,87 Dickson C.J. observed 
at pp. 1056-57 that: 
... Canada’s international human rights obligations should inform not only the in-
terpretation of the content of the rights guaranteed by the Charter but also the in-
terpretation of what can constitute pressing and substantial s. 1 objectives which 
may justify restrictions upon those rights. 
Further in Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act  
(Alberta),88 at p. 348, Dickson C.J., dissenting on another point, stated: 
… The various sources of international human rights law — declarations, cove-
nants, conventions, judicial and quasi-judicial decisions of international tribunals, 
customary norms — must, in my opinion, be relevant and persuasive sources for in-
terpretation of the Charter’s provisions. 
This approach was confirmed in the 1990 case, R. v. Keegstra.89 
In the recent 1998 case, Reference re Secession of Quebec,90 the Court exam-
ined the issue of whether or not it could answer a question of international law. 
The response of the Court at paragraph 20 confirmed the approach already 
taken by the Court: 
... this Court would not, in providing an advisory opinion in the context of a refer-
ence, be purporting to “act as” or substitute itself for an international tribunal. In 
accordance with well accepted principles of international law, this Court’s answer 
to Question 2 would not purport to bind any other state or international tribunal that 
might subsequently consider a similar question... [Emphasis added.] 
As for the contention that the Court, as a domestic court, must examine do-
mestic law rather than international law, the Court confirmed its past practice at 
paragraph 22: 
...In a number of previous cases, it has been necessary for this Court to look to in-
ternational law to determine the rights or obligations of some actor within the Ca-
nadian legal system. For example, in Reference re Powers to Levy Rates on 
Foreign Legations and High Commissioners’ Residences, [1943] S.C.R. 208, the 
Court was required to determine whether, taking into account the principles of in-
ternational law with respect to diplomatic immunity, a municipal council had the 
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power to levy rates on certain properties owned by foreign governments. In two 
subsequent references, this Court used international law to determine whether the 
federal government or a province possessed proprietary rights in certain portions of 
the territorial sea and continental shelf (Reference re Ownership of Offshore Min-
eral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] S.C.R. 792; Reference re Newfoundland 
Continental Shelf, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86). [Emphasis added.] 
In order to ensure that it was not discussing what would be a moot question, 
the Court delimited the boundaries of its foray into international law at para-
graph 23: 
...Question 2 of this Reference does not ask an abstract question of “pure” interna-
tional law but seeks to determine the legal rights and obligations of the National 
Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec, institutions that clearly exist as 
part of the Canadian legal order. 
(b) Recent Uses and Approaches 
(i) Examination of Four Recent Cases 
This section examines four recent cases that illustrate how international legal 
principles are considered or applied in the domestic legal order. The cases 
examined are: Finta, Baker, Burns and Suresh. Although a number of cases 
decided in the last decade have considered some important international law 
principles, we have limited our discussion to these four cases as they demon-
strate a good range of the relationships and complexities between the interna-
tional and domestic orders of law. This section does not analyze the ratio 
decidendi of each decision. Rather, it focusses on the aspects of the decisions 
discussing how international law is used in the domestic legal order. Besides 
setting out the issues of internalization addressed in each case, we also discuss 
whether the Court has taken a fugue or fusion approach to the use of interna-
tional law. 
By the “fugue approach”, we mean to include any case that has treated inter-
national legal obligations as separate from domestic ones and has required a 
formal intersection or interweaving of international law into the domestic legal 
order. 
By the “fusion approach”, we refer to those cases that have used interna-
tional legal obligations to inspire the interpretation of domestic obligations, 
resulting in the merging of elements of each order into a unified whole. 
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1. R. v. Finta 
In the 1994 case, R. v. Finta,91 the respondent, Imre Finta, was charged with 
a number of offences, constituting crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
pursuant to the domestic Criminal Code,92 for acts allegedly committed in 1944 
at or around Szeged, Hungary. This was a very lengthy decision and considered 
the application of international law to the domestic criminal legal order to 
sanction crimes that were committed outside of Canada. The decision resulted 
in a four to three split in favour of the respondent. Our discussion is confined to 
the key international law issue that seemed to divide the Court: the standard of 
the mens rea requirement for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
The majority opinion, written by Cory J., confirmed that s.11(g) of the Char-
ter allows customary international law to form a basis for the prosecution of 
war criminals who have violated general principles of law recognized by the 
community of nations regardless of when or where the criminal act or omission 
took place.93 He seems to have taken a fugue approach to the use of interna-
tional law in the domestic criminal order as he then went on to observe that: 
As Cherif Bassiouni has very properly observed, a war crime or a crime against 
humanity is not the same as a domestic offence. (See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes 
Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (1992).) There are fundamentally 
important additional elements involved in a war crime or a crime against human-
ity.94 [Emphasis added.] 
Cory J. wrote that the additional element involved in crimes against human-
ity is that the inhumane acts were based on discrimination against or the perse-
cution of an identifiable group of people. With respect to war crimes, the 
additional element is that the actions constitute a violation of the laws of armed 
conflict.95 Therefore, Cory J. did not accept the appellant’s argument that proof 
of the mens rea with respect to the domestic offences provides the element of 
personal fault required for offences under section 7(3.71) and that proof of 
further moral culpability is not required.96 He wrote: 
I cannot accept that argument. What distinguishes a crime against humanity from 
any other criminal offence under the Canadian Criminal Code is that the cruel and 
terrible actions which are essential elements of the offence were undertaken in pur-
suance of a policy of discrimination or persecution of an identifiable group or race. 
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With respect to war crimes, the distinguishing feature is that the terrible actions 
constituted a violation of the laws of war. Although the term laws of war may ap-
pear to be an oxymoron, such laws do exist. War crimes, like crimes against hu-
manity, shock the conscience of all right-thinking people. The offences described in 
s. 7(3.71) are thus very different from and far more grievous than any of the under-
lying offences. 
With respect to the mens rea of crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
Cory J. seems to suggest that these crimes are largely creations of the interna-
tional legal order and quite separate from any crimes in the domestic legal 
order. Therefore, in order to try these crimes in domestic courts, the approach 
to be taken is somewhat fugue-like, maintaining a division between the domes-
tic and international legal orders. 
Writing for the dissenting opinion, La Forest J. disagreed with the majority’s 
finding that a higher mental element is required for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. He observed that neither the jurisdiction nor the definition 
sections of the Code (section 7(3.71) and section 7(3.76) respectively) allude 
specifically to a mental element; these sections only refer to behaviour that 
constitutes an act or omission that is contrary to international law.97 In his view, 
the lack of express discussion of the mental requirement is “largely because 
nobody ever really thought that there was a need for an individual mens rea that 
went beyond that required for the basic nature of the conduct, whether that be 
murder, assault, robbery or kidnapping.”98 He went on to state that “...it seems 
justified to use our established common law rules of mens rea where the inter-
national law does not have specific standards.”99 
This statement seems to suggest that La Forest J.’s dissenting opinion fol-
lows a fusion rather than fugue approach. Although this is not explicitly set out 
in his opinion, it is possible to argue that La Forest J.’s approach attempts to 
merge elements of the two into a unified fusion. He explained that the standard 
set by the majority was too high and not in accordance with domestic law: 
In my view, this is far too high a standard; a mens rea need only be found in rela-
tion to the individually blameworthy elements of a war crime or crime against hu-
manity, not every single circumstance surrounding it. This approach receives 
support in Canadian domestic law. In R. v. DeSousa, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944, at pp. 
964-65, this Court held that reading in such a requirement for every element of an 
offence misconstrues and overgeneralizes earlier decisions of this Court.... [Empha-
sis added.]100 
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To further buttress his position, La Forest J. found that not only did Bas-
siouni, the writer relied on by the majority opinion, not represent the consensus 
of legal writers, but that the international law emerging out of the Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal and the war crimes and crimes against 
humanity decisions at Nuremberg did not support the need for a higher mens 
rea requirement.101 La Forest J.’s examination of the history of international 
law as jus gentium and jus naturalis appears again to suggest that he did not 
view international law as an entirely separate and distinct order from domestic 
law: 
Indeed, as one goes back through the history of international law, knowledge of in-
ternational law has never been a requirement for culpability. Traditionally, the 
western and Christian conception of international law especially in this area can be 
seen to coincide with the dictates of natural law; under the Roman Law, for exam-
ple the jus gentium which was applied to non-Romans was presumed because it co-
incided with the jus naturalis. In Grotius’ theory of international law, which 
applied to all individuals as well, the dictates of international law followed as dic-
tates of natural reason. Piracy or slavery would be contrary to international law as 
long as the accused had preyed on ships or traded in slaves, regardless of whether 
the pirates or slavedealers were aware of how their conduct was classified under in-
ternational law. In the international realm as much as the domestic, blameworthi-
ness in criminal law does not consist of knowingly snubbing the law, but rather in 
deliberately engaging in certain types of conduct that international law prohibits.102 
[Emphasis added.] 
2. Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) 
Possibly the most widely discussed case with respect to the use of interna-
tional law in a case that did not rely on constitutional law is Baker v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration).103 The appellant, a woman with Cana-
dian-born dependent children, was subject to a deportation order. She applied 
for an exemption, based on humanitarian and compassionate considerations 
under s. 114(2) of the Immigration Act,104 from the requirement that an applica-
tion for permanent residence be made from outside Canada. A senior immigra-
tion officer replied stating that no sufficient humanitarian and compassionate 
reasons warranted the processing of the application in Canada and cited no 
reasons for the decision. The issue before the courts was whether the officer 
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was required to make the best interests of the appellant’s children a primary 
consideration, pursuant to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.105 The 
Court was divided in a five to two split; the majority allowed the appeal and 
relied on, inter alia, a ratified but unincorporated international convention to 
inform its analysis, whereas the minority opinion disagreed with the use of an 
unincorporated convention in a non-Charter case. 
Writing for the majority, L’Heureux-Dubé J. appears to have taken a fusion 
approach to the use of international law in this administrative law case. 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. noted that although discretionary decisions are generally 
given considerable respect, 
... that discretion must be exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed in 
the statute, the principles of the rule of law, the principles of administrative law, the 
fundamental values of Canadian society, and the principles of the Charter.106 
Despite the absence of a mention of international legal norms in this list of 
“boundaries”, it appears that the majority decision employed the fusion ap-
proach and found that international norms inform the fundamental values of 
Canadian law. As L’Heureux-Dubé J. explained: 
The principles of the Convention and other international instruments place special 
importance on protections for children and childhood, and on particular considera-
tion of their interests, needs, and rights. They help show the values that are central 
in determining whether this decision was a reasonable exercise of the H & C [hu-
manitarian and compassionate] power.107 [Emphasis added.] 
A number of legal academics seem to confirm that the fusion approach was 
taken in these majority reasons. In particular, it has been described as using 
international law as “persuasive” rather than binding authority;108 as “illumi-
nat[ing]” the fundamental values of Canadian society;109 as “evidence for and 
of” such fundamental values;110 and as an application of “treaty presump-
tion.”111 
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Writing for the minority, Iacobucci J. agreed with the reasons and disposi-
tion of L’Heureux-Dubé J. apart from the effect of international law on the 
exercise of ministerial discretion in a non-constitutional law case. The approach 
taken by Iacobucci J. seems to be fugue-like, in keeping the two legal orders 
distinct from one another. He found that: 
It is a matter of well-settled law that an international convention ratified by the ex-
ecutive branch of government is of no force or effect within the Canadian legal sys-
tem until such time as its provisions have been incorporated into domestic law by 
way of implementing legislation: Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian 
Radio-Television Commission, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141. I do not agree with the ap-
proach adopted by my colleague... because such an approach is not in accordance 
with the Court’s jurisprudence concerning the status of international law within the 
domestic legal system.112 
Iacobucci J. cautioned against adversely affecting the balance maintained by 
the Parliamentary tradition, or inadvertently granting the executive the power to 
bind citizens without the necessity of involving the legislative branch.113 
We note that this caution only extends to administrative non-constitutional 
law cases. For constitutional law cases, Iacobucci J. indicates that he would 
adopt a more fusion-like approach to the application of international law, stat-
ing that: 
...I am mindful that the result may well have been different had my colleague con-
cluded that the appellant’s claim fell within the ambit of rights protected by the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Had this been the case, the Court 
would have had an opportunity to consider the application of the interpretive pre-
sumption, established by the Court’s decision in Slaight Communications Inc. v. 
Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, and confirmed in subsequent jurisprudence, that 
administrative discretion involving Charter rights be exercised in accordance with 
similar international human rights norms.114 
3. United States v. Burns 
In the 2001 United States v. Burns115 case, the respondents, Burns and Rafay, 
both Canadian citizens, were each wanted on three counts of aggravated first 
degree murder in the State of Washington. If found guilty, they would face 
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either the death penalty or life in prison without the possibility of parole. The 
Minister of Justice for Canada ordered their extradition pursuant to section 25 
of the Extradition Act116 without seeking assurances from the United States 
under Article 6 of the Extradition Treaty between Canada and the United 
States of America (amended by an Exchange of Notes)117 that the death penalty 
would not be imposed, or, if imposed, would not be carried out. 
In a unanimous decision, the Court found that the appeal should be dismissed 
in favour of the respondents. Section 25 of the Extradition Act creates a broad 
ministerial discretion whether to surrender a fugitive. The Court held that while 
constitutionally valid, the Minister’s discretion is limited by section 7 of the 
Charter. The issue was whether the threatened deprivation was in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice. Here the Court seems to have adopted 
the fusion approach in its use of international law. Among the various domestic 
legal considerations, the Court identified a number of international and compara-
tive legal factors favouring extradition only with assurances that the death penalty 
would not be sought. 
At the international level, the Court considered a number of indicia that the 
abolition of the death penalty has emerged as a major Canadian initiative at the 
international level and reflects a concern increasingly shared by most of the 
world’s democracies, including: 
 
• Canada’s international advocacy of the abolition of the death penalty it-
self;118 
• initiatives to abolish the death penalty on the international level;119  
• punishments available to ad hoc international criminal tribunals;120 
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• assurance provisions found in other international documents;121 
• documents requiring states to refuse extradition in the absence of effec-
tive assurances;122 and 
• the fact that personal characteristics of the fugitive are treated as miti-
gating factors in death penalty cases.123 
With respect to comparative law factors, the Court took into account the fol-
lowing comparative analyses: 
 
• state practices increasingly favouring the abolition of the death pen-
alty;124 and 
• a concern in other jurisdictions (the United States and United Kingdom) 
of potential wrongful convictions in death penalty cases.125 
Although it seems that the Court took a fusion approach to the use of interna-
tional law in this case, we note that it did so cautiously. In particular, the Court 
did not make a finding that there was an international law norm against the 
death penalty, instead, it simply observed that there was enough evidence to 
suggest it. It held at paragraph 89 that: 
This evidence does not establish an international law norm against the death pen-
alty, or against extradition to face the death penalty. It does show, however, signifi-
cant movement towards acceptance internationally of a principle of fundamental 
justice that Canada has already adopted internally, namely the abolition of capital 
punishment. [Emphasis added.] 
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4. Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 
In the case, Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),126 
released earlier this year, the appellant was a Convention refugee from Sri 
Lanka who had applied for landed immigrant status. In 1995, the Canadian 
government detained him and commenced deportation proceedings on security 
grounds, based on the opinion of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
that he was a member and fundraiser of an organization alleged to be engaged 
in terrorist activity in Sri Lanka, and whose members are also subject to torture 
in Sri Lanka. On the advice of an internal memorandum, the Minister of Citi-
zenship and Immigration issued an opinion declaring him to be a danger to the 
security of Canada under section 53(1)(b) of the Immigration Act, concluding 
that he should be deported. Although the appellant presented submissions to the 
Minister, he had not been provided with a copy of the internal memorandum, 
nor was he provided with an opportunity to respond to it. The appellant applied 
for judicial review. 
In a unanimous decision, the Court allowed the appeal in favour of the appel-
lant, holding that deportation to torture may deprive a refugee of the right to 
liberty, security and perhaps life protected by section 7 of the Charter. Consis-
tent with its constitutional law jurisprudence, the Court held that: 
The inquiry into the principles of fundamental justice is informed not only by Ca-
nadian experience and jurisprudence, but also by international law, including jus 
cogens. This takes into account Canada’s international obligations and values as 
expressed in “[t]he various sources of international human rights law — declara-
tions, covenants, conventions, judicial and quasi-judicial decisions of international 
tribunals, [and] customary norms”...127 
It appears that the Court took a fusion approach to the use of international 
law in the interpretation of section 7 of the Charter as it wrote: 
International treaty norms are not, strictly speaking, binding in Canada unless they 
have been incorporated into Canadian law by enactment. However, in seeking the 
meaning of the Canadian Constitution, the courts may be informed by international 
law. Our concern is not with Canada’s international obligations qua obligations; 
rather, our concern is with the principles of fundamental justice. We look to inter-
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national law as evidence of these principles and not as controlling in itself. [Em-
phasis added.]128 
However, in doing so, the Court again took a cautious approach to the de-
termination of whether or not a norm constitutes a custom of jus cogens. Noting 
the practical and theoretical difficulties of pinpointing when a norm becomes a 
peremptory norm,129 the Court chose instead to focus on three indicia that the 
prohibition of torture could be considered a norm of jus cogens: 
 
• a great number of multilateral instruments that explicitly prohibit tor-
ture;130 
• domestic practices of other states;131 and 
• decisions and writings of international courts and authorities.132 
The Court also noted that Canadian rejection of torture is reflected in the in-
ternational conventions which Canada has ratified: the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights133 and the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.134 It held that Article 
33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,135 which on its face 
does not categorically reject deportation to torture, should not be used to deny 
rights that other legal instruments make available to everyone. Taking the 
fusion approach, the Court found that international law generally rejects depor-
tation to torture, even where national security interests are at stake and that 
“[t]his is the norm which best informs the content of the principles of funda-
mental justice under s. 7 of the Charter.”136 
(ii) Analysis of Approaches: Fugue, Fusion or Hybrid? 
With the rise in the use of international law in constitutional law cases, we 
see that some cases warranted a fugue approach, such as: the majority decision 
in Finta and the minority opinion in Baker; whereas others warranted a fusion 
approach, such as the minority opinion in Finta, the majority decision in Baker, 
and the Burns and Suresh decisions. We are not suggesting that there is only 
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one appropriate approach nor that these are the only two approaches available. 
Indeed, it seems that the very nature of the split in the Finta and Baker deci-
sions suggests that perhaps a hybrid approach may be another possible option. 
More and more, we are seeing a rise in the use of international law to circum-
scribe the limits of constitutional law. As Iacobucci J.’s comments in his dissent-
ing opinion in the Baker case suggest, the Charter may be seen as a conduit or 
vehicle for international law to be used in the domestic legal order. Despite the 
increased use of international law in cases heard by the Court, we note that one of 
the key limits to the Court’s use is that it has never seen itself as a final arbiter of 
international law. For instance, in both Burns and Suresh, the Court acknowl-
edged that an argument may be made for holding that the prohibition against the 
death penalty and torture were notions of jus cogens, but stopped short of making 
that conclusion. 
We also observe that most of the cases examined above made use of interna-
tional law in constitutional law cases in a comparative manner, which does not 
require that a final determination be made on the ‘state’ of international law. In-
stead, it seems that comparisons with other jurisdictions has been the method 
employed by the Court to assess where the Canadian law stands against other 
jurisdictions. A number of recent cases have confirmed the Court’s using of inter-
national or comparative law as indicators that inspire or inform domestic law; see 
R. v. Advance Cutting and Coring Ltd.,137 and Lavoie v. Canada (Public Service 
Commission).138 
The rise of the use of international law in constitutional law cases before the 
Court is not without its challenges; these new challenges are examined below. 
3. New Challenges Accompanying Rise of Use of International Law 
(a) Need to Accommodate Increasing Number of Parties 
Accompanying the steady growth in the use of international law in constitu-
tional cases is the increase in the number of parties pleading principles of inter-
national law before the Court, including specialized interveners and amici 
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curiae. For example, in the 2001 Burns case, the Court had the benefit of five 
interveners: 
• two were international bodies; 
• one represented the Senate of another country; and 
• two were associations of lawyers.139 
This is an increase at least in the number of interveners since the last extradi-
tion cases heard a decade ago. For example, in Kindler v. Canada (Minister of 
Justice),140 and Ng, Re,141 the Court heard arguments from one and two interna-
tional interveners respectively.142 
In the 1999 Baker case, out of five possible interveners, one was an interna-
tional law intervener.143 
And finally, in the Suresh case, decided by the Court in early 2002, there 
were eight interveners:144 
• two were international bodies and relied on international law principles; 
• three were not international bodies but nevertheless relied on interna-
tional law principles; 
• one pleaded using comparative American law; and 
• only two did not plead international law principles. 
From these recent cases, it appears that the Court has acknowledged the in-
creasingly important role that non-traditional international law actors play in 
influencing the development of international law. 
(b) Need for International Law Evidence 
As the cases involving international matters become more complex, we fore-
see that there will be an increasing need for international law evidence. The 
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production and tendering of international law evidence in a domestic law case 
is a challenging task. As Brownlie notes: 
In the first place, there is in fact a serious problem involved in finding reliable evi-
dence on points of international law in the absence of formal proof and resort to the 
expert witness. Secondly, issues of public policy and difficulties of obtaining evi-
dence on the larger issues of state relations combine to produce the procedure 
whereby the executive is consulted on questions of mixed law and fact...145 
The Court has generally relied on published documents, provided by interna-
tional interveners, to fill this need. As issues grow in complexity, this method 
of evidence may not be sufficient to meet the demands of the issues examined 
by the Court. 
(c) Need for New International and Comparative Law Models 
As the argumentation of domestic constitutional law cases continues to look 
to international and comparative law sources, there is a need for new interna-
tional analyses and comparative models to be argued before the Court. What 
has been unhelpful in the past are recitations of principles of public interna-
tional law qua binding law without a discussion on their application in the 
domestic legal order. The Court has greeted with skepticism such blanket 
statements on the binding nature of international law. Instead, what is needed is 
an argument on the relevance of international law principles to the case to be 
decided. As international law is generally non-binding or without effective 
control mechanisms, it does not suffice to simply state that international law 
requires a certain outcome. 
Using comparative law in constitutional cases is helpful as it provides an in-
dication of other states’ practices and may shed light on Canadian practices, 
especially if the jurisdiction under examination is comparable to that of Can-
ada. Basing himself on the theory set out by E. Lambert, in his Encyclopedia of 
the Social Sciences,146 the author Alan Watson sees at least three models of 
comparative law: 
 
• descriptive comparative law: an inventory of the systems of the past and 
present as a whole as well as individual rules; 
• comparative history of law: examines ethnological jurisprudence, insti-
tutions, folklore, legal sociology, and philosophy of law; and 
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• comparative legislation: defines the common link between domestic 
doctrines of law.147 
Typically, what is argued before the Court belongs to the first category: de-
scriptive comparative law. However, this type of comparative law can be 
somewhat limited as it does not shed light on how the principle being compared 
can be incorporated into domestic law. Instead, what is sometimes needed is a 
more nuanced approach to comparative law.148 Without the depth of the other 
comparative methodologies, it is possible that arguments and therefore judg-
ments may succumb to the pitfalls of comparative law, including: superficial 
analyses, misunderstanding and mischaracterizing foreign law, improper or 
inappropriate comparisons, and the overgeneralization of complex issues.149 
IV. CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Over the past decade, a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court of 
Canada have discussed the application of public international law in constitu-
tional litigation and have situated principles of international law within the 
Canadian legal order. As the examination of the cases has shown, there are a 
number of challenges that arise with the increased use of international law in 
constitutional cases: 
 
• principles of public international law are difficult to define; 
• the application of principles of international law to constitutional law 
cases is cumbersome as there are questions of their legitimacy and the 
place they should occupy in or alongside domestic law; and 
• there are many value-laden terms attached to the use of particular inter-
national principles/documents; these do not translate automatically into 
legal principles. 
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As our examination of the recent cases indicates, in some cases there was an 
interweaving of two separate orders of law in the style of a fugue; in others, 
international law was applied in the domestic legal order in a fusion manner. 
For those who fear that perhaps a false dichotomy is set up by the subtitle of 
this paper, rest assured that we did not intend to hamstring the dialogue by 
suggesting that there are only two valid approaches and that one is preferred 
over the other; indeed, many cases have used elements of both approaches. 
Rather, our intention is to bring attention to these dominant approaches and to 
highlight the need to assess how one approach may be more appropriate in a 
given case. 
In our opinion, as the use of international law continues to rise, the Court 
will need more guidance from counsel with respect to the scope and limitations 
of international law. In particular, we suggest that the following issues be con-
sidered by the constitutional litigator intending to use international law: 
 
• Is this a case where there is a binding obligation? Or is it a value?150 
• What is the nature of the binding obligation? Is it based on conventional 
law that has been ratified and implemented into domestic law by legisla-
tion or a principle of jus cogens? 
• Is the international law simply a statutory interpretation aid?  
And of course, 
• Are the international law principles to be applied to the domestic legal 
order in a particular case as a fugue or fusion of voices? 
Courts should look forward to increased dialogue on this topic. 
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